New, updated version of the paper, presented firstly at this very web-site, now uploaded and downloadable (free) at SSRN.
Historical data on US aid to Israel illustrates incentives of political leaders and special interests, first and foremost in Israel. As on the early stages of Alliance Israel military capabilities could provide valuable services to USA, undermining USSR influence in the Middle East, the current relations are hard to explain by mutual national interests.
The paper focus on the political actors’ personal incentives, provides explanation for growing exploitation of US Aid by the special interests in Israel, while significance of the aid is approaching to insignificant level and contributes negatively to the country Defense capacity because of political conditionality imposed.
The data presented could support a new vision of US-Israel alliance: ceasing of the US Aid programs for Middle East could contribute both countries Defense needs.
Keywords: Political conditionality, Special interests, Political leverage
JEL Classification: D74, D78, D72, F35
working papers series
